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I.

INTRODUCTION
As western states face difficult resource allocation pro-

blems, Arizona's experience may offer instructive lessons. This
paper describes the 1980 Arizona Groundwater Management Act, offers
an appraisal of its accomplishments, comments on lessons to be
learned, and analyzes some unresolved problems. Part II introduces
the Act's essential features and focuses on the Arizona Department
of Water Resources' managerent tools. Part III briefly updates
legislative amendments since 1980.
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In Part IV, we conce trate on what other states might learn

7 First, legislation must not only profrom the Arizona experience.
tect existing water users but also pay heed to the concerns of
other, less powerful interests. Second, each state's history sets
the context within which change will occur. Reform efforts must
devise ways to bridge deep-rooted conflicts among interest groups.
Third, legal rules that are out of touch with hydrologic reality•
will produce a nightmare for administrators and decisionmakers.
Fourth, legislation that attempts to finesse serious conflicts by
delegating resolution to the discretion of administrators only
postpones the day of reckoning. Fifth, an administrative agency
must receive clear directions from the legislature and a regulatory
approach works best in conjunction with incentive and assistance
programs.
We address three current controversies in Part V. First, as
negotiated settlements quantify Indian reserved rights claims, who
will use the "wet" water? Second, the Central Arizona Project
("CAP") will supply Arizona with a substantial quantity of Colorado
River water. However, Arizona may be unable to make productive use

of some CAP water in the early years, and California and Nevada pm
have expressed a desire to augment their legal allotment of water
from the Colorado River. What will happen, in Congress or elsewhere, to Colorado River water rights? Third, state regulatory
• agencies are pushing and pulling water providers in different directions. Should we not eliminate inconsistent regulatory objectives?

II. SACKGROUND
In 1980, the Arizona Legislature enacted the Groundwater
Management Act, Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. SS 45-401 et seq., in order
to deal with chronic overdrafting of the State's groundwater reserves. This system replaced the traditional Reasonable Use Doctrine that had permitted virtually unlimited use of groundwater.
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The Act embraced a number of innovative features including a system
for quantifying groundwater rights that protected all existing
users within Active Management Areas (AMAs), which essentially comprised the heavily populated areas of the State. The Act also
erected a' permit system that restricted new groundwater use within
AMAs, created a new state water agency with strong management authority, the Department of Water Resources ("DWR" or "Department"),
and insisted on water conservation by agricultural, industrial, and
municipal users.
The Act operates like a ratchet, moving only in one direction: that of controlling water use. It requires DWR to develop
a series of Management Plans that, over 45 years, will aim to reduce the quantity of groundwater used. Inside AMAs, the Act prohibits the irrigation of new lands, encourages a shift from irri2
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gation to less consumptivei non-irrigation uses, and prohibits a
shift from non-irrigation uses to irrigation.
The basic policy objective of the Act is to achieve an
equilibrium between groundwater withdrawal, and natural and artificial recharge, or "safe-yield." To achieve safe-yield, the Act
provides DWR four management tools: (1) conservation requirements,
(2) water augmentation and conservation assistance funds, (3) an
"assured water supply" program, and (4) the potential for state
retirement of agricultural land.
The conservation program which is included in DWR's management plans provides an administrative structure for statutorilydefined conservation standards, the details of which are beyond the
scope of this paper. Thus far, some evidence suggests that the
conservation program has nrt been particularly effective, but, as
each successive management plan tightens the ratchet on various
water users, there is hope that substantial conservation will be
achieved.
The Act's conservation program contains two essential weaknesses. First, for the municipal sector, the conservation measures do not address the necessity of limiting the absolute
quantity of groundwater that is used. Rather, the Legislature
mandated reductions in gallons per capita per day ("GPCPD") usage.
These reductions ignore the fact that, as the State's population
increases, each new consumer will create additional demands for
water.
Second, the Act chose generous historical measurements as the
baseline for what it expected of agricultural irrigators. Although
water duties assume an increase in efficiency above historic use,
3

the allotments are based on the maximum irrigated acres in the historic period. The Act then gives 100% credit to irrigators whose
water use is below the conservation target. The credits accumulate
in an uncapped "flexibility account" which farmers may either use
in subsequent years or sell to other irrigators in the year immediately following the accrual. As of 1992, farmers had accumulated
approximately 3 million acre feet (MAY) of credits, prompting a
former director of DWR and a prominent Arizona water lawyer to conclude that "conservation requirements for some farmers are meaningless." Kathleen Ferris, The Arizona Groundwater Management Code:
The First Ten Years, in Uinta's Water Law: Overview and Current

Topics 129, 149 (State Bar of Arizona 1990).

The second management tool, the water augmentation and conservation assistance program, comes from the Act's provisions (and
y

recent amendments) allowing DWR to collect annual groundwater withdrawal fees from various parties. The rationale for this program
is twofold: first, to provide technical assistance and encourage
acquisition of additional supplies; second, to provide grants and
other direct conservation assistance. Unfortunately, the Act significantly restricted the effectiveness of. this program by setting
the withdrawal fees at an extremely low rate. figg Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. S 45-611 (Supp. 1991).
In Arizona, the principal augmentation source is the Central
Arizona Project (CAP). As the CAP comes on line and agricultural
and municipal water providers begin to use CAP water, it is hoped
that some of the overdraft problems will be alleviated. In the
Tucson area, CAP will serve two-thirds of the water demand in the
year 2025. Effluent utilization and recharge of surplus supplies
4
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are also important componerts of the augmentation program. Other
options are being considered at the state level but those that
offer the possibility of yielding substantial additional water,
such as watershed managem nt and weather modification, are likely
to encounter environmental objections and funding problems.
The third management tool that the Act provides DWR is the
"assured water supply" (AWS) program. Under the Act, private water
companies, municipalities, and private developers must demonstrate
to DWR that they have an adequate supply of water for their
customers prior to approval of new subdivisions. Under the Act,
an assured water supply means that (1) there is sufficient quantity
and quality of water availlble to satisfy the needs of the proposed
use for 100 years; (2) the proposed use is "consistent with the
management plan and achirement of the management goal"; and,
(3) the water provider or developer has demonstrated the financial
capability to construct the delivery system and any necessary
treatment works. The assured water supply requirement has been
extremely controversial.
During the 1980s, tkie 100-year supply element led a number
of Arizona cities and towns to purchase large farms in rural Arizona with substantial water rights. The cities and towns reasoned
that these water rights could either demonstrate a "supply" or the
water could be transported from the rural areas to the cities for
urban uses. Rural communities responded bitterly to this development which they perceived as threatening their economic
independence and future.
DWR has struggled with developing rules to implement this
portion of the Act. In February 1992, DWR published a concept
5

paper providing various options for administering the assured water
supply program and setting out a two year process at the completion
of which the Department will promulgate regulations.
A fourth management tool, allowing state retirement of agricultural rights, will be available in the future. As of the year
2006, the Act permits DWR to set up a program for purchasing and
retiring agricultural rights. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 45611(A)(3) (Supp. 1991). A problem with this tool comes not only
from its delayed implementation but also from the funding for the
program. Although DWR can levy and collect various fees from persons withdrawing groundwater, the fees for purchasing and retiring
agricultural rights may not exceed $2 per acre foot per year. Only
a sharp increase in the fees that DWR may charge all groundwater
users in AMAs will provide an adequate fund to produce a meaningful
retirement of irrigation water rights.

III. RECENT LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The Groundwater Transportation Act of 1990 resolved many of
the rural/urban issues by severely limiting the number of groundwater basins from which water could be transferred to the AMAs and
by addressing various economic and environmental concerns. Other
recent legislation has improved access to renewable supplies for
remote portions of Active Management Areas. This additional
flexibility is expected to facilitate adoption of assured water
supply rules and the achievement of safe-yield. New legislation
includes provisions for recharging water into aquifers for
subsequent recovery, creates an "in-lieu" or indirect recharge
program transferring current renewable supplies for future
6

groundwater rights, and authorizes the formation of new water
districts in the Phoenix and Tucson AMAs. The Phoenix district,
if formed, would have mandatory membership for all non-irrigation
users, and a replenishment tax on all mined groundwater. The
Tucson version is a voluntary approach, with water users
contracting with the district for access to renewable supplies.
These major changes to the Groundwater Act have addressed some of
its weaknesses. The amount of energy devoted to legislation that
is generally supportive of the objectives of the Act testifies to
the desire to make Arizona's groundwater management system work.

IV. LESSONS LEARNED
A. Include Existina and Potential Users and Interests in
Reform Efforts
The Arizona Groundwater Management Act experience offers a
number of lessons to other states facing conflicts between an increased demand for water rnd inadequate supplies. First, it is
extremely unlikely that any legislation will pass that does not
protect the interests of existing water users. In Arizona, the GMA
was the product of prolonged and sensitive negotiations among irrigators, the mines, and cities. Their constituencies accounted for
essentially all water contumption in the State. Had any of the
three key interests refused to get aboard, the Legislature would
not have enacted the Act.
When existing interests were excluded, problems ensued. The
failure to include rural interests, developers, private water
companies, Native Americans, and environmentalists in the negotiating sessions has prove

to be a source of conflict since 1980.
7

The developers have been most upset about the assured water supply
rules, while environmentalists found the lack of protection for instream flows and riparian habitat problematic. As a consequence,
the State has recently been reexamining the structure of the GMA
in light of the interests of developers and environmentalists. The
failure to include less powerful, though still substantial,
interests permitted the legislation to be enacted but put off the
day of reckoning with developers and environmentalists.
B. Respect the Teachings of History
Another lesson concerns respecting the wisdom of history.
In Arizona, there is deep-rooted antipathy between the cities and
mines, on the one hand, and farmers on the other. In Arizona and
every other western state, farmers consume 80 percent or more of
each state's water. Cities criticize farmers for using excessive
water. Farmers, in turn, perceive the cities as attempting to take
away their way of life without compensation. In Arizona, the
cities and mines have opposed buying farmers' water rights because
that would allow the farmers "to retire to La Jolla and raise
martinis." Withoutsuch a program, however, the Arizona experience
suggests that it may be impossible to achieve safe-yield.
It is essential both to recognize this historical antipathy
and devise ways to bring the antagonists together. All interests
in the State of Arizona have a significant stake in achieving the
safe-yield goal. Otherwise, the water table in the aquifers will
continue to decline, thus imposing on all users spiraling energy
costs. As U.S. Congressman George Miller said in a speech last
December, "Only in water are we prepared to lock up the resource
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in a fashion as to deny it the flexibility to meet competing
needs."
A recent proposal toward this end is retiring current water
uses. See Robert Jerome Glennon, "Because That's Where The Water

Is": Retiring Current Waier Uses To Achieve the Safe-Yield Objective of the Arizona Groundwater Management Act," 33 Ariz. L.
Rev. 89 (1991). Without a reduction of water use by current users,
it may be impossible to achieve the safe-yield goal because each
new user places additional demands on the resource. The most
likely area to curtail current uses is agriculture which annually
consumes 80% of the State's water. The proposal advocates creating
incentives to reduce 'nitration use. Although the mechanics of
this proposal are beyond the scope of this paper, DWR could use the
assured water supply program in order to require or provide incentives to new development to purchase and retire existing water
rights. By conditioning new water uses on achieving a net ren, Arizona can move towards safe-yield.

duction in water consumpti

I

This proposal takes into account the profoundly changing role
of agriculture in Arizona's economy. As recently as 1960, agriculture contributed approximately 25% to the total state income.
Today,

however,

that figure hovers around one percent.

Many

farmers and irrigation districts are eager to sell their land
and/or water rights to cities and developers. The development community may agree to absorb some increase in costs in exchange for
a supply of potable water.

9

C. Surface Water and Groundwater: The Myth vs. Hydrologic
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Reality
Arizona has a bifurcated system of surface and groundwater
law which results in considerable inconsistency in achieving water
management goals. Arizona's grandfathered groundwater rights
system in AMAs moves away from the reasonable use philosophy of
prevailing groundwater law. For the owners of farmland, the right
to irrigate exists in perpetuity, but there are incentives and requirements to conserve water. Arizona's surface water law of prior
appropriation (first in time is first in right) unfortunately is
inconsistent with its groundwater law. The most significant conflict is the failure to protect senior surface water diverters from
junior pumpers of hydrologically-connected groundwater.
The Department's position is that all sources of water need

CM

to be managed conjunctively to achieve the safe-yield goal. However, recent court cases such as Arizona Public Service v Long,
160 Ariz. 429, 773 P.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1989), have dealt major blows
to the Department's authority to manage effluent even indirectly.
The failure to focus on the general water supply conditions,
regardless of the source of supply, may be the weakest part of the
Code.
The incongruence of the surface and groundwater law is a
major concern in two pending General Adjudications of surface water
rights. These Adjudications will determine the priority and volume
of surface water rights in the Gila River and Little Colorado River
watersheds, which cover most of the State. The Gila River Adjudication, with 66,000 claims, is one of the largest civil cases ever
handled in the United States. A primary dispute involves ground10
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water pumpage in the vicinity of streambeds. If the Special Master
determines that groundwater pumping of water hydrologicallyconnected to surface flows interferes with senior prior appropriation rights, this finding may conflict with groundwater rights
established by the Act. Because the Adjudications will probably
stretch out over 15-20 years, the outcome of these conflicts will
not be known for some time. The lesson from this experience is the
imperative of avoiding the construction of legal boundaries that
are not hydrologically supportable.
Arizona has enjoyed more success in respecting hydrologic
reality and regional differences in the establishment of AMAs.
The focus on the AMAs has proven a bit myopic because rural areas
have been virtually ignored while a major planning effort was concentrated on the AMAs, but the use of basin boundaries rather than
political jurisdictions facilitates sound policymaking and administration. It has allowed the planning process to respond to localized demand and supply conditions as well as to specific community
values. The recent water transfer debate illustrates that the data
gathering and planning focus must now respond to the needs of water
users in rural areas as well. This fall, the Department will release for public review a State Water Assessment which will analyze
water supply and demand issues statewide.
D. Assured Water Supply: The Ongoing Debate
The original drafters of the Act chose not to address the
thorniest issue in groundwater management, limitations on groundwater usage by municipal development. Although the Act's criteria
for assured water supply require that new developments use water
in a manner that is consistent with the management goal, the Act
11

left the specifics of this program to the discretion of the direc-

Tm

tor through the rulemaking process. Lloyd Burton in "The Arizona
Groundwater Management Act: Origins and Issues" in Takina the
Arizona, Groundwater Manaaement Act into the Nineties, Univ. of
Ariz. Water Resources Research Center, issue paper No. 8, at 13
(1990), offers a historical explanation , for this situation:
An analysis of negotiations leading up to the act's
passage indicates that, to a remarkable extent, the
director was given so much power for much the same
reasons that the interior secretary gained control over
management of the Lower Colorado River in the 1968 act
authorizing construction of CAP. Essentially, whenever
negotiators came upon an issue over which they reached
an impasse and compromise proved impossible, they
simply decided to delegate that determination to the
DWR director.
The financial implications of the assured water supply program for individual landowners are significant because renewable
water supplies will have to be used in lieu of mined groundwater.

pm

The political implications have become painfully obvious. In fact,
the Department's first attempt to adopt assured water supply rules
in 1988 resulted in such a public outcry that the proposed rules
were withdrawn. The lesson from this Arizona experience is that
too much administrative discretion may be as damaging as too much
legislative involvement in the details of implementation.
The assured water supply rules that are now in process are
expected to be substantially different from those promulgated in
1988. The Department's concept paper concentrates on the issue of
consistency with the safe-yield goal. This is the key component
of the program, because it controls how much groundwater will be
pumped for future municipal use. The Department is attempting to
maximize public input because of the substantial implications.
12
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Despite the political outcry, the impending development of assured
water supply rules signals a major achievement: long-term planning
has become a reality. Arizona's historical dependence on groundwater has insulated many areas from the impacts of short term
drought. But, as the state has become more dependent on renewable
supplies, water supply and demand projections have become routine
parts of utility planning.
An even more amazing change since 1980 is the acceptance of
the role of conservation in water supply planning. When compared
to identifying and obtaining new supplies of water, the costeffectiveness of conservation is no longer questioned by most large
utilities. The long-range plans for the cities of Tucson and
Phoenix, for example, substantial reductions in demand over the
next 100 years as a result of plumbing and landscape ordinances,
conservation-oriented rates, education activities, rebates and
other conservation programs. Effluent use, which is used interchangeably as a conservation program and a supply enhancement, has
also gained legitimacy and acceptability as municipal providers
scramble to show sufficient long-term supplies.
E. Mandatory Conservation: The Need for a Kinder. Gentler
DWR
Despite the growing acceptance of conservation, Arizona's
highly regulatory approach to conservation has been strongly criticized by farmers and municipalities alike. The lessons to be
learned from this criticism include: first, that legislated,
enforceable conservation requirements must not impose an overwhelming administrative burden on the agency or the regulated corn-
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munity, and, second, that incentive and assistance programs should
accompany regulatory measures.
Unlike the assured waterS supply section of the Act, most
conservation standards in the statute are extremely specific,
especially for the agricultural sector. These requirements have
resulted in a data-intensive, cumbersome process for setting annual
allotments for farms. The analysis used in setting a farm's "water
duty" includes crop histories, consumptive uses for each crop historically grown, cost-benefit studies of various alternative
management practices and irrigation systems, amortization costs,
subsidies, etc. Using this information, the Department has set
allotments for 10,000 farms.
In order to try to be as equitable as possible, the Department developed a highly sophisticated water allocation model. The
complicated data base and assumptions have resulted in substantial
confusion and suspicion on the part of the agricultural community.
In the context of a devastating economic climate and plummeting
crop prices, agricultural interests have generated substantial
sympathy in the Arizona Legislature. As a result, a bill may pass
this session that will reduce agriculture's future conservation
requirements, in spite of the millions of acre-feet of credits in
farmers' flexibility accounts.
DWR's conservation programs, which are more highly regulatory
than those in any other state, have created a communication problem
with the regulated community. As one effort to foster better relations, DWR supported a recent amendment to the Act that added
conservation assistance programs to the management plans. The

14
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combination of a carrot and a stick will hopefully result in
increased water conservation.

V.

CURRENT CONTROVERSIES
This section will consider several recent and unresolved

controversies. These disputes pose significant political,
economic, and environmental challenges to the State of Arizona.
A. Indian Water Rights Settlements: The Last Watering
Hole?
A major wild card in the Arizona water management scheme is
the settlement of Indian water rights claims. The Indian reservations in Arizona are so large that application of the practicably
irrigable acreage ("PIA") standard would undoubtedly exceed the entire State's annual renewable supplies. Negotiated settlements
have made substantial progress in quantifying Indian water rights
claims. For one tribe alone, the Gila River Indian Community, the
negotiations involve a water budget of 650,000 acre-feet per year.
Thus, the impact on other users may be profound.
It is not clear how the Indians will use the water rights
obtained through these settlements. Although some water will
undoubtedly be used for agricultural and municipal uses on reservations, it is assumed that Indians will lease, transfer or exchange much water to non-Indian users. The quantities of water
involved clearly make this potential source the "next watering
hole" for thirsty municipal interests. Some speculation suggests
that the Central Arizona Project canal, originally conceived as an
agricultural project, then transformed into a municipal growth
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supply, may end up delivering more water for Indian claims than to
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any other sector.
B. The Central Arizona Project: An Impending Crisis?
Water issues in Arizona have been multiplying over time as
DWR has struggled to implement the Act. In the 1992 legislative
session, the Department tracked over 40 water-related bills. However, these regulatory issues pale in relation to the potential
crisis associated with the Central Arizona Project.
In 1968, the Colorado River Basin Project Act authorized
construction of the CAP. Over 330 miles in length, the canal will
bring Arizona's share of Colorado River water to municipal entities
in central Arizona such as Phoenix and Tucson, as well as numerous
irrigation districts. It includes 13 pumping stations that will
lift the water 3,000 feet to the terminus south of Tucson. The
total cost of the project is almost four billion dollars, including
non-federal distribution system costs.
The Central Arizona Water Conservation District (CAWCD) is
a three-county special district that will operate the CAP canal
and oversee the repayment of Arizona's share of the cost, approximately two billion dollars. Prior to 1995 when the aqueduct is
completed, the State will begin annual payments of approximately
$45 million to repay capital charges and fixed operations and
maintenance charges. CAWCD's revenues come from the sale of water
and power, plus an ad valorem real estate tax that has been
collected since 1974.
In 1983, the U.S. Secretary of the Interior allocated 638,823
acre-feet of CAP water per year to municipal and industrial (M &
I) users and 309,828 acre-feet per year to Indian users. The CAP
16
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allocations for agricultural users are based on a percentage of the
available supply because agricultural users have a lower priority
on the system and are expected to take reduced deliveries in shortage years. The CAWCD has estimated the amount of CAP water available for agriculture in a "normal" year to be 550,000 acre-feet.
It was assumed that agricultural users would take the bulk
of the CAP deliveries in the early years, with municipal uses expanding over time as agricultural lands are converted for urban
development. CAWCD's subcontractors have constructed distribution
systems for agriculture that can deliver approximately 900,000
acre-feet per year. There is currently no other demand in Central
Arizona for the use of this much water, and some observers believe
the water will not be used for the next 20 to 30 years.
As the CAP system nears completion, there is substantial
doubt about whether agricultural users will be able to afford to
use their CAP allocations. The size of the agricultural debt is
a staggering $300 million with more than 2/3 in federal interestfree loans and the remaining debt in private loans. Moreover, a
combination of circumstances, mostly related to the falling price
of cotton and assessments charged by irrigation districts to pay
for CAP capital improvements, has pushed many agricultural districts to the brink of bankruptcy. Arizona Governor Fife
Symington, with assistance from Elizabeth A. Rieke, Director of
DWR, has initiated a task force with representatives from water
agencies, municipalities, agricultural and Indian interests to
identify mechanisms to utilize more CAP water in the early years.
Ideas being contemplated include a tax to maximize recharge opportunities, municipal subsidies of agricultural use in exchange for
17

some future benefit in water or money, and the possibility of sale
or lease of CAP water out of state.
In addition, U.S. Congressman George Miller, the chairman of
the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, has affected CAP
utilization in Arizona by taking a strong stand for reclamation
reform. As a consequence, large farms in Arizona (over 960 acres
in size) continue to be precluded from using CAP water. As an
unfortunate by-product of this reform, these farms will continue
to use mined groundwater into the foreseeable future.
The potential for agricultural bankruptcies and the difficulties farmers face in meeting their repayment obligations are
substantial concerns. These concerns are exacerbated by pressure
from California to continue to divert Colorado River water in
excess of its 4.4 million acre-feet allocation (MAP). The lower
basin states have an annual right in a normal year to 7.5 MAF. As
Arizona's usage increases, California must reduce its normal year
diversions from the present level of 5.2 MAP.
In addition to California's 6-year drought, other factors
have increased California's need for additional water supplies to
serve the southern part of the State. The endangered species
issues and water quality problems in the Bay-Delta have curtailed
diversions from the Sacramento River. A recent judicial decision
protecting fish habitat in streams that feed Mono Lake has also
limited supplies available to Los Angeles. Finally, the demographics of Southern California suggest that water demand will
increase in spite of conservation efforts.
In August 1992, California

through the Colorado River Board

of California, circulated to the other Colorado River Basin States
18
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a report containing several proposals to increase California's
interim supply of Colorado River water. The concept paper recognized that Colorado River reservoir levels are currently being
drawn down. California argued, however, that average annual runoff
exceeds average annual depletions and a surplus therefore exists
that should permit California to increase its diversions. Second,
the report advocated creation of an "interstate water bank," that
would allow individuals to sell Colorado River water across state
lines. Finally, the report suggested establishing an escrow
account to pay "damages" for excess use. Since all of these proposals are likely to damage Arizona's interests, Arizona has been
understandably reluctant to negotiate on these points. Arizona and
other basin states recognize, however, that California's water
supply problem will take time to resolve.
There is also considerable trepidation in Arizona that
California might flex its incredible political power in Congress
to amend the Boulder Canyon Project Act, which initiated the
allocation of Colorado River water among the upper and lower basin
states and Mexico. If this were to happen, Arizona's short-term
inability to utilize CAP could result in a loss of long-term
supplies due to the possibility of a congressional reallocation.
The desire to maximize CAP usage has resulted in ten indirect
or "in-lieu" recharge projects and applications. The indirect
recharge projects involve delivery of excess CAP water to
agricultural users in return for the right to pump the groi)indwater
that they would have used. Most of these projects are being subsidized by CABCD or municipal interests, who will benefit from the
recharge credits in the future.
19

Another groundwater management implication of this temporary
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glut of available CAP water is the difficulty of enforcing conservation requirements while simultaneously encouraging additional
CAP use. The Department's perspective is that despite the
temporary high resource availability all water supplies should be
used efficiently. However, the Department has taken steps to relax
the conservation targets for municipal and agricultural entities
that are using non-groundwater supplies. For example, the Second
Management Plan contains an Alternative Conservation Program that
allows more water use in the non-residential sector if the use is
based on non-groundwater supplies.
The Arizona Legislature is presently considering a bill (HS
2452) that provides an alternative to the gallons per capita per
day ("GPCD") standard for municipal providers who eliminate their
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dependence on mined groundwater. The bill would allow the Director
to replace the GPCD standard with residential and non-residential
measures designed to achieve the same efficiency as the GPCD.
However, if the bill passes, total water use by these entities may
increase. In the case of the agricultural sector, the bill would
substantially relax the conservation requirements. The bill would
permit higher water duties for those using non-groundwater supplies, exemptions for some areas that are upstream in an aquifer
from a waterlogged area, and easier water duty standards in the
management plan that takes effect in the year 2000.
Another component of the current water supply scenario is

interest shown by California and Nevada in recharging surplus
Colorado River water in Arizona, in the expectation that Arizona
would need to divert less Colorado River water in dry and normal
20
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years. Nevada interests have also considered buying Arizona
farmland with CAP allocations so that the allotment could be used
permanently in Nevada.
Among the CAP use options receiving the most attention in
Arizona are subsidies for agricultural water users. Some feel that
irrigation districts are in such bad financial shape that cheaper
water costs will make little difference in their viability. Others
believe that increasing CAP utilization is worth whatever it costs,
even if a side-effect is artificially supporting the agricultural
economy.
CAP issues are evolving rapidly at both the interstate and
intrastate level. Hopefully, the "crisis" can be reframed into an
opportunity to resolve a number of water allocation issues and
institutional limitations.
C. Colliding Reaulatory Objectives
State administrative agencies are pulling water providers in
different directions. On the one hand, the State's public utility
commission (the Arizona Corporation Commission) has authority over
privately-owned water companies. These for-profit corporations
receive an exclusive franchise from the ACC and, in return, agree
to provide water to anyone within the service area. The ACC comprehensively regulates private water companies, especially the
rates charged to customers. Because the ACC understandably
envisions its mission as preventing private water companies from
exploiting their monopoly position and gouging their customers, the
Commission insists that companies have a convincing justification
for a rate increase. Moreover, the rate increase process, involving public notice and hearings, consumes a considerable period
21

of time and is itself rather costly. This "regulatory lag" slows
the implementation of any rate increase.
In sharp contrast, the conservation mandate of the Groundwater Management Act encourages higher water rates, at least in the
short term. Natural resource economics suggests that water consumption is responsive to the price structure of a market system.
Sharp increases in water rates almost always translate into reduced
consumption. While DWR is insisting that water companies encourage
their consumers to conserve water, the ACC opposes significant rate
increases for fear of consumers suffering "rate shock." The ACC
has also been reluctant to allow "pass-through" of conservation
costs to customers, or to allow increases to offset the reduced
revenues that result from a successful conservation program.
Results of some recent rate hearings indicate that the ACC may also
be limiting access to renewable supplies through their pricing
policies.
One finds a similar collision of regulatory objectives between the ACC and the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality
("DEQ"). The ACC seeks to maintain the lowest possible water rates
while DEQ favors higher rates that would generate funds to assure
water quality protection. As the state agency charged with primary
responsibility over the environment, DEQ has an obligation to insure that the requirements of the Clean Water Act and the Safe
Drinking Water Act are met. Recent amendments to these acts have
created substantial financial demands on water utilities around the
country.
In Arizona, a utility may receive reimbursement for costs
associated with complying with these acts, but only after the
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expenditure has been made. The rub comes when a water utility
expends funds for water conservation or water quality pursuant to
DWR or DEQ regulations, and later discovers that the ACC is unwilling to allow the utility to recover these moneys from its ratepayers. Needless to say, this process does not encourage utilities
to engage in water conservation or water quality efforts. In 1989,
these conflicts led to the creation of a Private Water Company
Advisory Committee, composed of representatives of the three state
agencies and private water companies. The Committee was alas,
unable to resolve the conflicts, although a policy statement in
support of conservation was ultimately adopted by the ACC.
For both municipal water companies and private water companies, existing water rate structures impede the providers'
ability to meet environmental and conservation requirements. The
utility rate principles for water do not recognize that the resource has any inherent value. A quick reminder of basic principles of water law may help make this point clear. Water law
traditionally recognizes rights to divert surface water based on
the Prior Appropriation Doctrine (first in time is first in right)
and to rights to pump groundwater based on the Reasonable Use
Doctrine (any application for a beneficial use is permissible).
These doctrines allow exploitation of a valuable resource, oftentimes a nonrenewable supply, without exacting any fees or charges
for the resource. In other words, the water is free. To be sure,
a farmer who diverts surface water must bear the cost of constructing the ditches and canals for transporting the water from
the water course to his or her fields. Similarly, a groundwater
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pumper often bears substantial electric or other energy costs.

(Th

These costs notwithstanding, the resource is still free.
Thus, investor-owned water companies must attempt to serve
two masters. DWR, pursuant to the Groundwater Act, requires water
providers to establish water conservation programs. However, the
Department has no power to impose rate increases or' exact costs.
Instead, it must focus on mandating efficiency standards or specific conservation programs, such as retrofitting of toilets or prohibitions on single-pass cooling water. One might think that
higher water rates would better achieve water conservation, thus
rendering unnecessary programs mandated by the administrative
agency.
The commendable concern with protecting the consumers of both
public and private water companies has unfortunately limited the (Th
flexibility of these water providers to encourage water conservation among their consumers. To eliminate these conflicting
regulatory objectives may require substantial legal and institutional changes that would allow the implementation of an environmentally-sensitive structure of water pricing.

VI. FUTURE PROSPECTS
Judging from the ever-escalating pace of amendments to the
Groundwater Management Act, there is some cause for concern regarding whether its essential structure will survive. Although
recent changes have generally supported achievement of the safeyield goal, it remains to be seen whether the Legislature will
provide DWR with adequate resources to administer and enforce the (Th
increasingly more complex Act. Having already taken a 10% cut this
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year, the DWR staff now faces an additional 10% reduction, while
new responsibilities proliferate. It is possible that the whole
structure could collapse under the sheer weight of this administrative burden.
On the other hand, some recent legislation substantially
reinforces the commitment to safe-yield. The Replenishment District legislation in the Phoenix AMA, for example, would result in
safe-yield for municipal and industrial users 15 years prior to
the 2025 deadline.
The success of the Arizona water management approach seems
more apparent on supply-side issues than on conservation. In
analyzing the savings available from conservation, it is clear that
agricultural retirement and increased utilization of CAP and
effluent are crucial to achievement of the safe-yield goal. The
availability of Indian water right settlement water for offreservation uses is critical, as is the resolution of the CAP
utilization crisis and interstate negotiations over Colorado River
water. The assured water supply rules also hinge on renewable
supply availability. Institutional changes like the Augmentation
Authority and the Replenishment District should enhance opportunities for outlying areas to have access to these supplies, thereby
enhancing the political acceptability of the rules and the likelihood of achieving safe-yield.
In whatever way Arizona resolves these current issues, one
thing is certain: new problems will emerge. Increasing demands
on a limited resource that is nothing less than the essence of life
will prevent any solution from being permanent.
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